Glen Rangwala argues that the attempt in Afghanistan by the British and US to handover control to a loyal Afghan force has failed.

The continued killings in Afghanistan this year of US, British and French troops by members of the Afghan security forces mark not just more untimely deaths in an escalating war – they have the potential to create a fundamental breach in the western way of war. All recent occupations led by NATO powers have had a basic common strategy. After the invasion, the local army, if it exists, is dismantled and then reassembled under foreign tutelage. They have a strictly subordinate role at the start, with the decision-making role held by a member of the occupying military force. As a pro-Western government is installed, and a system of obedience towards and control by that government is inculcated into the local army, the foreign commanders shift to a monitoring role. These external overseers become decreasingly visible as the appearance of occupation slips away – and expensive western armies can be withdrawn, ready to fight another war, elsewhere in a world that appears from Washington to be consistently unruly.

In this way, proxy armies are created. It is an approach that was applied from Kosovo and Sierra Leone to Haiti and continued through to the Bush wars of Iraq and Afghanistan. Iraq, though, introduced a newly disruptive element: armed political groups ushered their own members through the army recruitment process, enabling both the easy smuggling of weapons and supplies out from the national army and into the hands of the militias, and the ability to use loyal army units for partisan purposes. The US, needing an Iraqi army quickly to fight the multiple enemies it had created throughout the country, was simply unable to screen every recruit to the new Iraqi army. They ended up taking everyone who volunteered to join.

Thus was created the embedded insurgent. In Iraq, though, the main purpose of the militias in inserting their members into the army was to fight their local opponents. The pro-Iranian Supreme Council became so dominant in the internal security forces that they were able to turn them into death squads whose main role was to capture, torture or assassinate Sunni nationalists, using the facilities and funds given to them by the US for this purpose. Week by week, the US generals in Iraq would proclaim the growing strength and capacity of the Iraqi army, without acknowledging the object that this strength and capacity was being put towards.

Afghanistan is one step on from this. In March Foreign Secretary William Hague told Parliament that “insurgent infiltration” affected “only isolated rogue elements” within the Afghan National Security Forces, and that the plan to hand over full control to them by 2014 still stands. The continuation since then of fatal attacks on NATO personnel by those they purport to be training – now occurring at the rate of one per week, and happening throughout the country – demonstrates instead the systematic nature of the rift that has opened up between the US-led foreign force and the people to whom they are scheduled to be handing over power.

US and UK officials talk about the importance of better screening of recruits, but this is to miss the point. From the limited information released so far, it seems clear that at least some of the members of the Afghan security forces who have killed NATO personnel have been in their posts for years, and some had reached senior ranks. Some of these individuals will have joined with sympathy for the armed insurgency against the occupation; others will have developed that while within the forces. The fact that many – at least seven – who have attacked NATO personnel within their bases managed to escape also indicates that others within the Afghan army have been supportive. Either way, the problem for NATO is not with a screening process, but instead in fighting a war that has little sense of purpose left for those who are actually doing the fighting.

This is hardly a minority opinion any longer. In 2011, the US military commissioned a study into relations between the Afghan army and NATO. The resultant report – A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility – was so damaging that after it was published, the US retracted copies and placed classified status upon it (although it only takes a few seconds to find a copy on the internet). Although it was written before the major escalation of killings over the past few months, the report leaves no doubt over the extent to which members of the Afghan security forces reject the US attempts to create a compliant tool out of them. In the words of the report, many members of the Afghan army see the NATO force as “unwelcome and oppressive occupiers”; “virtually all” the groups of Afghan soldiers interviewed for the report expressed the opinion that the US has “zero interest” in preventing Afghan civilian casualties; and many admire those who engage in suicide bombings against US targets.

All this should hardly be a surprise to anyone who has followed the war in Afghanistan over the past ten years. Instead, what should be shocking is, instead, the way in which William Hague’s comments on how disloyalty to the US project in Afghanistan is the preserve of “isolated rogue elements” went unchallenged. Equally shocking should be the extent to which the British press continues to describe those engaging in attacks on NATO personnel in terms such as “dressed in Afghan army uniforms”, as if they are not really members of the Afghan security forces.

Increasingly, they are not imposters within the otherwise loyal structure of the Afghan army – they are the Afghan army.

Recent killings have led to a policy in which Afghan soldiers are now not allowed weapons in the presence of foreign personnel unless a NATO “guardian angel” is standing watch over them. The façade of joint missions between NATO and Afghan forces has been abandoned, replaced with a strict hierarchy in which one side is seen as trustworthy and the other as suspicious. For Afghans, who remember the killing spree by US staff sergeant Robert Bates in March, the sense of anger will be compounded with bitterness at the hypocrisy of the US military. The US, when it finally departs from Afghanistan, will be leaving a force there in control of the country that is no more susceptible to conforming to external wishes than the Taliban was in 2001.

There will, however, be a wider consequence. Afghanistan has demonstrated the flaw in the plan of recruiting a local force to stand in for an army of occupation. This will surely be a lesson absorbed by future insurgent groups. Politicians in the US and UK, preoccupied with trying to explain away the ongoing war, have not even begun to understand the consequences of this for their continued attempts to create proxy forces to serve their interests around the world.

Aisha Maniar, London Guantánamo Campaign, explains how the Government is planning new restrictions on civil liberties.

Just weeks after the May 2010 General Election, the Government announced a series of measures to “get to the bottom” of the rising tide of litigation and allegations that the British intelligence services had colluded in the torture and abuse of prisoners abroad. The two main limbs of this were the Detainee (or Gibson) Inquiry, which collapsed at the beginning of this year, and the publication of a Green Paper on justice and security. Published in October 2011, the Green Paper contained sweeping measures involving in particular the extension of closed material procedures (CMPs) already used at the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) potentially to all civil cases.

A public consultation ended this January, yielding highly critical responses to the proposals and their stated purpose. Given the potential threat posed to the judiciary by these measures as well as the human rights implications, the parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) held its own inquiry.

Its report, published in early April, was damning of the Government’s plans, stating that they provide “no case for extensive change”.  It questioned plans to replace common law Public Interest Immunity (PII) certificates, issued by the courts on a case by case basis to determine whether or not disclosure of sensitive material should be made, with statutory closed material procedures (CMPs) such as those used at SIAC.

Having tried to do this in the case brought by former Guantánamo Bay prisoners against the Government for its alleged collusion in their torture and rendition (which formed the basis of the Government’s argument), the JCHR inquiry found that the Government had failed to demonstrate that there was any need to do so.

Some of the harshest criticism of the Government’s plans has come from special advocates, the security-vetted barristers who are used in such procedures and who are in a better position than most to understand the true implications of their use. The JCHR strongly endorsed their view that CMPs are “inherently unfair”. The JCHR also dismissed the Government’s proposals for CMPs to be extended to inquests – the Government’s third attempt to do so over the past decade.

In spite of this barrage of criticism and opposition from all quarters, the Government is seeking to press ahead with its plans. Circumventing the White Paper stage which usually follows, the Justice and Security Bill was announced in the Queen’s Speech. On the date of publication of the JCHR report, Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg belatedly called for a rethink of the plans. However, whether he and the Lib-Dems will oppose the plans in Parliament remains to be seen.

One of the key criticisms of the plans is the Government’s sincerity in its alleged desire to protect national security and the public interest: many have accused it of acquiescing to the demands of the intelligence services and foreign intelligence agencies, such as the CIA. The proposals would put British intelligence above accountability and scrutiny and assign the powers of the judiciary to the very ministries likely to be under investigation.

During the JCHR inquiry, it was revealed that there are potentially 27 similar cases in which such measures could be used if the Government is allowed to. While offering protection to the Government and its friends, it renders the claims of crimes against humanity brought by the claimants ineffective, as the truth and justice they are seeking will be muted in the alleged interest of national security.

As cases at SIAC have demonstrated over the past 15 years, while it is a delicate balancing act between national security and sensitive material, secret evidence is really no evidence at all. The serious allegations made will not be addressed and, as stated by the JCHR chair Dr Hywel Francis MP, the proposals overall are a radical departure “from our longstanding traditions of open justice and fairness”.

Human rights and legal NGOs who have already put up stiff resistance to the plans will continue to oppose them as they pass through Parliament. At a parliamentary meeting in March held by several organisations, many MPs from across all parties attended to express their dismay at the proposals. What opposition they put up in Parliament remains to be seen once the Bill is published.

Mike Phipps looks at the political fall-out from the stalemated elections and Michael Roberts examines the economic impact.

Just six weeks after the Greek General Election, new elections have been scheduled for 17th June to attempt to break the country’s political deadlock. Against this background, IMF leader Christine Lagarde has suggested there will be a “messy exit” from the euro.

In the election on 6th May, the conservative New Democracy came top with 18.8% of the vote, but they beat the Radical Left Coalition Syriza by just 2% of the vote. The social democratic PASOK came a poor third on 13.2%. With opinion polls currently putting Syriza on over 25%, they could win the June election – and win the 50 bonus seats that first placed parties  get under the Greek electoral system. This could give the parties to the left of PASOK an overall majority, leading to the prospect of a hard left anti-austerity coalition. It’s small wonder the Troika – the European Commission, IMF and European Central Bank (ECB) –  are talking up disaster scenarios and threatening to withhold the next slice of Greece’s bailout, due in late June.

The collapse of the mainstream parties in May’s elections and the rise of Syriza are unprecedented. Syriza took the core public sector vote from PASOK. Overall, the radical left – Syriza, the communist KKE and anti-capitalist Antarsya – got 55% of the blue collar vote in the public sector and 45% in the private. The level of polarisation was underlined by the 7% vote for the Nazi Golden Dawn which, surveys suggest, about half of Athens’ police force voted for.

May’s huge rejection of imposed austerity is likely to be even more pronounced in June’s poll. Most Greek voters really have no other choice given the massive attack on their livelihoods and, close up, the bailout looks less appealing once it is realised that 90% of the cash is going to the banks to guarantee debt interest payments.

This is what Syriza wants to renegotiate. While the Troika can threaten to stop their next payment of 31 billion euros, a refusal by the Greek government to pay the debt could be a strong negotiating tool.

Michael Roberts reports: Immediately after the second election, the Government is supposed to find yet more cuts worth another 11 billion euros, or 6% of Greece’s fast disappearing GDP, to meet Troika demands. Austerity is not working. The Greek economy is on its knees. The economy is contracting at a rate of 6%, unemployment is around 25% and one in two young people are unable to get a job. Richer people are now voting with their bank accounts and taking their money out of Greek banks at the rate of 1 billion euros a day. It will all be gone in weeks, so the banks will have to rely on the Bank of Greece printing money to keep them afloat.

Greece has missed its target for improved tax collection. It has missed its target for reducing the deficit. With the banks running out of money, there is a real danger of a disorderly default on Greece’s debt. Given their earlier lending to Greece, eurozone countries and the ECB could be exposed to the tune of 750 billion euros in potential losses.

Default, exit from the euro, a contraction of the Greek economy by 10%, a 50% devaluation, galloping inflation, no credit, bankruptcies mushrooming – this is the scenario. Europe’s leaders, the ECB and the EU Commission are using it to frighten the Greek electorate into voting for parties that back the Troika’s austerity package because, as EU Commission President Manuel Barros put it, there is no alternative (TINA).

TINA was the slogan of British Prime Minister Thatcher in the 1980s as she dismantled the welfare state, shackled the unions and promoted inequality and the deregulated financial sector that brought us to this mess. Now it is the slogan of the Troika.

There IS an alternative. If the Greek people are freed from servicing a massive debt of up to 160% of GDP by a negotiated default, the Government will free up funds to finance a programme of public investment and jobs to revive economic growth. The banks must be nationalised, not bailed out, in order to provide credit for small businesses and households. With a proper progressive taxation system on wealth and income, the richest Greeks can start paying towards that recovery – something they have avoided for decades. The current flow of funds out of the country by the rich must be curbed through capital controls.

There must be a pan-European campaign to support a renegotiation of the bailout package, along with an initiative across Europe for publicly-led investment backed by a publicly owned banking system. An anti-austerity government in Greece after 17th June can only succeed with the backing of the rest of Europe. Otherwise, ordinary Greeks will face a generation of austerity or be forced to go it alone outside the euro and the European Union. Inside or outside the euro, Greek capitalism cannot be made to work.

Richard Price analyses a great victory for the left – but the new President is already backtracking.

After the party comes the sobering dawn. François Hollande’s victory in the French presidential election was a great symbolic blow to the hegemony of right wing austerity. It was also a rejection of the attempts of both Nicholas Sarkozy and Marine Le Pen to make the election a referendum on immigration and Islamophobia. With the fall of Berlusconi, the prospect of defeat for Angela Merkel next year, and the massive rejection of the Greek political class, Europe’s tectonic plates are shifting.

However, in office Hollande shows every sign that he will govern as a moderate social democrat. On the campaign trail he was forced to the left by the pressure of Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s Left Front, declaring that “austerity can no longer be the only option.” His first cabinet, however, is distinctly mainstream, with Martine Aubry – architect of the 35-hour week – overlooked as Prime Minister in favour of “consensus builder” Jean-Marc Ayrault.

Plans to renegotiate the European stability pact that restricts government spending face strong opposition from Merkel, who declared it “not open to new negotiations”. The likely outcome of Franco-German talks is that Merkel will accept a commitment to growth being attached to the stability pact, some diversion of EU funds into major infrastructure projects and the expansion of the capital base of the European Investment Bank.

Domestically, Hollande remains committed to balancing the budget by 2017, some of it by a 75% wealth tax on earnings above €1 million. There are plans to create 150,000 jobs for young people and a series of measures to decentralise power. Presidential and ministerial salaries are to be cut by 30%.

So far, so good: but any new government spending plans are to be offset by budgetary cuts elsewhere. As for a projected “pact of trust” between employers, unions, banks and local authorities, most governments since the 1930s have proposed something similar to little effect. Laurent Fabius, Prime Minister during the right turn of the Socialists in 1984-6, is back as foreign minister. Already Hollande is backtracking on his campaign pledge to pull all French troops out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

Hollande plans to bring the French budget deficit down to 3% by next year, but he inherits an economy with considerable problems. GDP has flatlined for the last six months and unemployment has hit 10%.

The presidential election showed a country more divided than at any time in the last decade. Opinion polls predicted Hollande and Sarkozy’s first round score fairly accurately. Marine Le Pen of the Front National (FN), who polled 17.9%, finished about 2% ahead of projections, while the Left Front’s Jean-Luc Mélenchon won 11.1%, about 2% less than expected.

This was the best ever result for a far right presidential candidate, although it was less than the combined vote for Le Pen senior and Bruno Mégret, who led a split from the FN, in 2002. There is no simple explanation for the FN’s support. Up to 35% of FN’s voting base is working class, and Le Pen polled well across a swathe of the post-industrial north and east. By linking anti-immigration rhetoric to anti-globalisation fears, Le Pen positioned herself as the champion of France’s millions of “small people” against the French and EU political elites, picking up the votes of shopkeepers, the self-employed, the unemployed and the elderly.

In the south, both Le Pen and Mélenchon polled above their national share, while Sarkozy generally did worse. Le Pen won her only department – the Gard – in the south as well as scores of small coastal communes.  Clearly occupational status only explains so much, as there are instances of Le Pen and Mélenchon winning neighbouring wine villages in the south.

Although Mélenchon’s result was slightly disappointing – he had been on 15% in mid-April – nothing can detract from his inspiring campaign. He outpolled Le Pen in central Paris and in Seine-St-Denis, covering the northern and eastern suburbs. Of France’s next ten largest cities, he beat Le Pen in six – Lyon, Toulouse, Nantes, Bordeaux, Montpellier and Rennes – and only finished half a per cent behind Le Pen in Strasbourg.

Hollande won the second city of Marseille, which has a strong FN presence, with Mélenchon fourth on a creditable 14%. The result in Toulouse – scene of two shootings in March that Sarkozy used to ramp up Islamophobia – was particularly gratifying for the left, with Hollande and Mélenchon winning just over 50% between them.

Candidates to the left of Hollande polled a total of 5,426,875 votes (15.1%) compared to 3,876,920 (10.6%) in 2007. Since almost all these appear to have transferred to Hollande in the second round, this was a powerful factor in Hollande’s victory. The Socialist share rose more modestly from 9,500,112 (25.9%) to 10,272,705 (28.6%).

The second round showed more clearly the changing political geography of France. Hollande won every department on the Atlantic coast – once a stronghold of the right – except the Vendée (still counter-revolutionary after all these years!) He took Paris and much of rural central and south western France. Sarkozy won most of the north east, the east and the south east, including Provence – once a bastion of socialism.
Much now depends on the two rounds of legislative elections on 10th and 17th June. The Socialists currently control 21 out of 22 regional governments in Metropolitan France. Control of the National Assembly together with the presidency would complete an unprecedented dominance. Opinion polls for the first ten days of May suggest that support for the UMP is running higher than Sarkozy’s presidential score. They put the UMP on 32%, the Socialist Party on 30%, the FN on 16% and the Left Front on 9%.

Jean-Luc Mélenchon has announced that he will stand against Le Pen in the northern town of Henin-Beaumont, near Calais where Le Pen lives.

He said: “In this battle, two visions for solving the crisis will be confronted, so let’s compare. Is the problem with the immigrants or is it with the bankers? For us, it’s the bankers.”